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INTRODUCTION 
 Have you ever thought you were speaking the same language, 
only to discover the meaning of the words was completely different?  
Surely any American who has been a tourist in England or Australia 
has had that experience.  Those of us who have teenagers face such 
challenges on almost a daily basis.  When viewing crimes from the 
world of the immigration courts, the certainty that we are talking 
about oranges instead of apples is a frequent and sometimes perplex-
ing conundrum.  
 Terms that seem straightforward in the criminal law context 
have different meanings under our immigration laws.  Some disposi-
tions that states treat as rehabilitative and non-criminal are treated as 
a criminal conviction under the immigration laws.  Some non-violent, 
fairly trivial misdemeanors are considered aggravated felonies under 
our immigration laws.  Seen from the view of the immigration courts, 
such disconnects and starkly different realities are not infrequent and 
occur in ever-increasing numbers. 
 The points of intersection between our criminal laws and im-
migration laws seem to have multiplied exponentially over the years.  
With the recent Supreme Court decision of Padilla v. Kentucky, the 
impact of criminal convictions and the ramifications they have under 
our immigration laws have been acknowledged as crucial concepts 
that every criminal lawyer has a duty to understand.1 
The purpose of this Article is to provide a basic overview of a body 
of law that has been compared as second only to tax law in its com-
plexity.2  Our goal is to highlight the major areas where criminal laws 
intersect with and impact noncitizens through the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.3  No mere article could be comprehensive in this 
 
 1. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010).  The Third Circuit be-
came the first circuit court of appeals to rule that Padilla has retroactive applicability. 
See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011).  Subsequent decisions 
from other circuits, however, have held that Padilla should not be retroactively ap-
plied. See United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th 
Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Chaidez v. United States, No. 10-3623, 2011 WL 3705173, at *3, 
*8 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011). 
 2. See Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration and Naturalization, 847 F.2d 
1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (“With only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration 
laws have been termed ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
 3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) will hereinafter be referred to 
as the “Act” or the “INA.”  Immigration law is exclusively of the federal domain.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the authority to admit or exclude noncitizens 
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complicated area of the law that is the subject of voluminous treatises 
and is subject to constant and rapid revision.4  However it is our hope 
to orient non-immigration lawyers and judges to how the outcomes of 
their work in the criminal courts impact noncitizens when they enter 
our world, the immigration courts.  
This Article is framed as an introduction to “Immigration Law 
101,” providing information needed to understand the structure of the 
Act and basic tools to speak the language of that Act.5  It is intended 
to help attorneys and judges preserve the intent of criminal court or-
ders, so that they are implemented consistently with the understand-
ing held by the parties at the time of issuance, averting unintended 
consequences when the conviction is viewed later at the immigration 
court level.  It is our hope that this article will provide a lens through 
which non-immigration lawyers can peek through to our world and 
make sense of what they see.  
We will start by briefly addressing some common misconceptions 
held by lawyers and non-lawyers alike.  Then we will discuss the basic 
structure of immigration law and some of its unique terminology.  
Next, we explain to whom the law applies and where the immigration 
courts fit into the immigration law scheme.  We will then delve more 
deeply into the central concepts of removability and inadmissibility, 
using criminal grounds as our point of reference and examples.  Then 
we move on to a discussion of Matter of Silva-Trevino, a 2008 Attor-
ney General decision regarding crimes of moral turpitude that has 
dramatically changed the landscape of the issue of removability for 
various crimes in immigration courts.6  We next turn our focus to 
point out the special ways in which the term “conviction” is defined in 
the immigration context and how criminal acts can have immigration 
consequences even when no conviction exists.  Next, we provide a 
very simplified overview of the most common forms of relief sought 
in the course of removal proceedings.  Finally, we will explain the 
possible impacts of Padilla v. Kentucky on pending removal proceed-
ings and prior deportation orders. 
 
from the United States is fundamentally a sovereign act. See United States ex. rel. 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
 4. See, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW 
& CRIMES (2002); IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK (12th ed. 2010). 
 5. Please be advised that the citations provided in these footnotes are not in-
tended to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as starting points of authority to research 
these propositions. 
 6. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (B.I.A. 2008).  
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I.  COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS 
In addition to being an extremely complex legal field, immigration 
law suffers from being a field of law plagued by rampant misconcep-
tions.  For example, it is not true that marrying a United States citizen 
confers automatic immigration status.7  Many people believe that law-
ful permanent resident status is guaranteed for life, yet long-time law-
ful permanent residents, including those who are married to United 
States citizens and are the parents of United States citizen minor chil-
dren, can become deportable based on a single misdemeanor convic-
tion.8  United States citizens cannot help their undocumented parents 
to legalize their status in the United States until they reach the age of 
twenty-one.9  At that juncture there are significant obstacles to lawful 
status (sometimes ones which cannot be overcome) if, as is generally 
the case, the parents entered the United States without proper inspec-
tion by an immigration official or overstayed a period of nonimmi-
grant status which was once held by them.10  Even more surprising to 
many people, some individuals who were born abroad have automati-
cally inherited United States citizenship and do not even know it.11 
There are also widely held misconceptions regarding the authority 
of immigration judges to grant relief.  In many cases, an immigration 
 
 7. A noncitizen married to a U.S. citizen must first be granted an immigrant visa 
and then be admitted to the United States at a port of entry or through adjustment of 
status, at which time the grounds of inadmissibility are applied. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1181(a) (2006) (requiring that a noncitizen possess a valid unexpired immigrant visa 
at the time of application for admission); id. § 1182(a) (listing the grounds of inad-
missibility under which a noncitizen will be rendered ineligible for admission to the 
United States); id. § 1255(a)(2) (requiring that a noncitizen be eligible for an immi-
grant visa and be admissible to qualify for adjustment of status). 
 8. See Habibi v. Holder, No. 06-72111, 2011 WL 4060417, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 
2011) (affirming the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that the lawful 
permanent resident petitioner was removable and ineligible for relief from removal, 
even though his sole conviction was classified as a misdemeanor under California 
law). 
 9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives” as including 
only parents of U.S. citizens who are “at least 21 years of age”). 
 10. See id. § 1255(a) (requiring that the noncitizen have been “inspected and ad-
mitted or paroled into the United States” to be eligible for adjustment of status); id. § 
1182(a)(9) (rendering inadmissible individuals with specified periods of unauthorized 
presence). 
 11. See Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 797, 
798–99 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (“Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of 
the United States, who [sic] father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such 
child is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States . 
. . .”). 
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judge has no discretion to stop removal in a sympathetic case.12  Be-
cause immigration court proceedings are civil in nature, respondents 
are not entitled to free legal representation and 60% of respondents 
are unrepresented, a figure which rises to 84% when non-detained 
cases are taken out of the calculation.13  Immigration judges have a 
typical caseload of more than 1200 pending cases, a number that has 
recently been on the rise.14  Most immigration judges are scheduled to 
be in court on the bench thirty-six hours each week.15  They do their 
jobs without bailiffs or court reporters and have access to only one-
fourth of a judicial law clerk on average, as four judges usually share 
one clerk.16  Perhaps most challenging of all, the majority of immigra-
tion judges’ decisions are rendered orally from the bench immediately 
at the conclusion of proceedings, without the benefit of a transcript or 
time for research or reflection.17 
 
 12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (requiring the noncitizen seeking relief from 
removal to establish not only that a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted if 
the relief sought is discretionary, but also that he satisfies statutory eligibility for re-
lief). 
 13. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS 
TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE 
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5–8 (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_com
plete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 14. See Oversight Hearing on the Executive Office for Immigration Review Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of J. Dana 
Leigh Marks, President, National Association of Immigration Judges), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Marks100617.pdf [hereinafter Marks Testi-
mony]; ARNOLD & PORTER LLP FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION 
ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE 
INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICA-
TION OF REMOVAL CASES (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) ES-28 (2010) [hereinafter ABA 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutive 
Summary.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Backlog in Immigration Courts Continues to 
Climb, TRAC IMMIGRATION (March 11, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/225/. 
 15. See Marks Testimony, supra note 14, at 2. 
 16. By comparison, most federal district court judges have a caseload of around 
400 pending cases.  In addition to having a bailiff and court reporter to assist them, 
most of them have three full time law clerks. See id.  Also by comparison, Veterans 
Law Judges decided 729 veterans benefits cases (less than 200 of which involved 
hearings) per judge in 2008, and Social Security Judges decided approximately 544 
cases per judge in 2007. See ABA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 14, at ES-28. 
 17. See TRAC Immigration, Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Re-
sulting Wait Times Grow, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Jun. 18, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/208/; see also Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the 
Immigration Court System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
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II.  SOME IMMIGRATION LAW BASICS 
Terminology in this field is problematic even within the immigra-
tion law itself.  The current law was amended in 1996, replacing de-
portation and exclusion proceedings with removal proceedings.18  The 
proper technical term for an order expelling someone from the Unit-
ed States is now “removal,” however colloquially many people still 
refer to having been ordered “deported.”  Thousands of outstanding 
deportation orders still exist19 and can be either enforced or reinstat-
ed in a variety of factual contexts.20  The term “deportation,” howev-
er, is still frequently used in colloquial speech to describe both depor-
tation and removal proceedings, despite significant legal differences 
between the two.21 
Removal proceedings commence when a charging document called 
a Notice to Appear issued by the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) is filed with the immigration court.22  The individual against 
whom the charges are lodged is referred to as the respondent.  In re-
moval proceedings, the immigration judge must decide whether the 
 
Cong. (2011) (statement of the National Association of Immigration Judges), availa-
ble at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735d 
a16c9946 (click webcast). 
 18. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 587-97. 
 19. See  Fact Sheet: ICE Fugitive Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS EN-
FORCEMENT (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/fugops.htm 
(estimating that by the end of the 2009 fiscal year, there were approximately 535,000 
“fugitive alien cases” in which a noncitizen had been ordered removed, deported, or 
excluded by an immigration judge, but had not left the United States or reported to 
DHS for removal). 
 20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2006) (providing for the reinstatement of a removal 
order where a noncitizen reentered the United States illegally after having been re-
moved or having departed voluntarily under an order of removal). 
 21. Removal proceedings are a unified process for what were previously referred 
to under the INA as exclusion proceedings and deportation proceedings. See, e.g., 
IIRIRA, §§ 304(a)(3), 306(a), 309(d), 110 Stat. at 589–96, 607–12, 627 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1229a–c, 1231, 1252); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Cor-
pus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 966 
(1998) (“IIRIRA realigned the vocabulary of immigration law, creating a new cate-
gory of ‘removal’ proceedings that largely replaces what were formerly exclusion 
proceedings and deportation proceedings . . . .”).  In many ways the procedures re-
main substantially unchanged as there are still significant legal distinctions between 
those individuals who are seeking admission as opposed to those who have already 
entered the country, either legally or illegally. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) 
(stating that the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating he is clearly and beyond 
doubt entitled to admission), with id. § 1229a(c)(3) (stating that the burden is on 
DHS to demonstrate that an individual who has been admitted is removable). 
 22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). 
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individual is removable as charged.23  After that decision is made, the 
judge must also decide if the individual can apply to remain in the 
United States.  These applications to remain in the United States are 
generally referred to as “applications for relief from removal.”24 
III.  THE GOVERNMENT PLAYERS 
The nation’s Immigration Court, which has fifty-nine locations in 
the United States, Puerto Rico and Saipan, employs approximately 
260 immigration judges.  These courts comprise the trial level tribunal 
which determines whether or not a respondent in proceedings is re-
movable as charged.25  Often of equally great consequence to the in-
dividual, immigration judges are additionally charged with identifying 
and adjudicating a variety of applications for benefits which may be 
available.  When these benefits are sought at the immigration court 
level, they are frequently referred to generically as “relief from re-
moval.”  Decisions made by the immigration judges can be appealed 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals by either party.26 
IV.  THOSE SUBJECT TO THE IMMIGRATION LAWS 
Most basic to our immigration laws is the fact that people fall into 
two categories, United States citizens and noncitizens, whom the Act 
defines as “aliens.”27  No United States citizen can be removed (de-
ported), denied admission or prosecuted for a crime in which alienage 
is an element.28  Proof that one is a United States citizen is the most 
comprehensive defense to a charge of removability or inadmissibility 
as it mandates termination of the proceedings.29 
 
 23. See id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A). 
 24. See id. § 1229a(c)(4). 
 25. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated Apr. 2011).  The Immigration 
Court is housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Office 
of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), which is located in the U.S. Department of 
Justice. See id. 
 26. See id.  EOIR also houses the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board” or 
“B.I.A.”), which is responsible for administrative appellate review of removal deci-
sions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(2011).  
 27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States as an “alien.”). 
 28. See United States v. Higuera-Llamos, 574 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“Alienage is a specific element of this offense [illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 
1326(a)], and the government must prove alienage beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining “alien” as “any person not a citizen or na-
tional of the United States”); id. § 1229a(a)(1) (providing that “[a]n immigration 
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There are four basic ways to become a United States citizen: birth 
in the United States or a U.S. territory; derivation of U.S. citizenship 
at birth abroad through U.S. citizen parent(s); acquisition of U.S. citi-
zenship upon the naturalization of a minor child’s parent(s); or natu-
ralization.30 
All persons who are not United States citizens are termed aliens 
and are subject to our immigration laws.  Because the term “alien” is 
often misunderstood and viewed as a pejorative term outside the im-
migration law field, this article will refer to “individuals” or “people,” 
with the understanding that for purposes of our discussion, those re-
ferred to in that way are not United States citizens or nationals. 
Noncitizens fall into various categories under the Act: lawful per-
manent residents (immigrants);31 non-immigrant visa holders;32 un-
documented;33 and many others who are present with the knowledge 
of the government but hold a variety of different statuses, including, 
but not limited to parolees,34 deferred action status,35 extended volun-
tary departure,36 and deferred enforced departure.37 
Lawful permanent residents can live and work in the United States 
permanently so long as they do not become inadmissible or deporta-
ble, terms which will be described later in this Article.  They can trav-
 
judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an 
alien”) (emphasis added). 
 30. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1427, 1431, 1433; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). 
 32. Id. § 1101(a)(26). 
 33. Id. § 1182(a)(7)(A). 
 34. When used in the Act, “parole” is a status which can be provided to an indi-
vidual who is stopped at a port of entry and alleged to be inadmissible.  Rather than 
detain all such persons pending a hearing before an immigration judge, at the discre-
tion of DHS some are “paroled” into the United States, thereby allowing them to be 
free from detention during the pendency of their application process or proceedings 
before the immigration court. See id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“The Attorney General may . 
. . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as 
he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or sig-
nificant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States . . . .”). 
 35. On rare occasions, DHS exercises its prosecutorial discretion to allow other-
wise removable individuals to remain in the United States.  Some of these individuals 
have never been in removal proceedings while others are subject to final orders of 
removal.  This is a temporary status which can be terminated at any time DHS 
chooses, thereby restoring the individual to the legal position he held prior to the 
grant of deferred action. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & 
Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, and Chief 
Counsel, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, (June 17, 2011), available at http:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.  
 36.  See KURZBAN, supra note 4. 
 37.  Id.  
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el outside the United States and return, subject to certain re-
strictions.38  They can petition for their spouses and unmarried sons 
and daughters to become lawful permanent residents, subject to nu-
merical limitations, which are often referred to as a “quota” or “visa 
number requirement.”39  Lawful permanent residents may choose to 
naturalize to become United States citizens after a specified period of 
residence.40 
The Act contains more than twenty categories of nonimmigrant vi-
sas.41  Examples include tourists for pleasure or business, students, 
temporary professional workers, performers and athletes, and victims 
of violent crimes or human trafficking.42  These categories have strict 
initial qualification criteria, as well as explicit conditions which must 
be fulfilled in order to maintain valid status.43  Individuals holding 
such status must comply with all terms of their visa or they become 
subject to removal.44 
Undocumented individuals, sometimes referred to as “illegal al-
iens” or “undocumented workers,” include people who have entered 
the United States without proper inspection by an official of the DHS 
and those who entered with a visa or permission that has expired or 
become invalid.45 
V.  REMOVABILITY AND INADMISSIBILITY 
Under the Act, there are separate provisions which render an indi-
vidual inadmissible to enter the United States (sometimes despite an 
otherwise valid visa) and provisions which cause an individual who is 
in the United States to become removable.46  With few exceptions, 
 
 38. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(20), (27)(A); Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749, 752 (B.I.A. 
1988). 
 39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2). 
 40. See id. § 1427(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 319.1(a)(3) (2011).   
 41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). 
 42. See id.  
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(C). 
 45. See id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the United States without be-
ing admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place oth-
er than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”); id. § 1227(a)(1)(B) 
(“Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any 
other law of the United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation 
authorizing admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked 
under section 1201(i) of this title, is deportable.”). 
 46.  Compare id. § 1182(a) (describing classes of inadmissible aliens), with id. § 
1229(a)(1) (describing reasons for removal proceedings). 
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every time a noncitizen seeks to enter the United States from a trip 
abroad, he or she is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility.  The 
grounds of inadmissibility also apply to individuals in the United 
States who are seeking to obtain lawful permanent resident status; a 
statutory prerequisite for “adjustment” to that new status includes a 
mandate that the applicant is not inadmissible.47  Even people who 
are already in the United States and who hold legal status can become 
removable by violating a condition of their immigrant or nonimmi-
grant status or by committing an act or crime that is a ground for re-
moval.48 
The interplay between these complicated and contradictory provi-
sions relating to inadmissibility and removability creates fertile 
ground for confusion, even for experienced immigration practitioners.  
Additionally problematic is the fact that individuals who are inadmis-
sible or removable due to criminal convictions (as well as some viola-
tions of civil protective orders) are often barred from satisfying statu-
tory eligibility requirements for various forms of relief from 
removal.49  State, local or foreign convictions, as well as federal con-
victions, may render someone inadmissible, removable, or bar them 
from relief.50  One reason this may occur is because the Act provides 
that many types of convictions, and some types of conduct, bar people 
from demonstrating the good moral character required for most 
forms of relief.51  Placed in this context, it is easy to see how unin-
tended consequences can flow from criminal convictions due to the 
 
 47. See id. § 1255(i)(1)(C). 
 48. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(C). 
 49. See id. § 1229b(a)(3) (stating the Attorney General may cancel removal of 
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the U.S. if the alien has not been con-
victed of an aggravated felony); id. 1229b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (stating that failure to show 
good moral character during the statutory period and convictions for certain offenses 
bar eligibility for non-lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal); id. § 
1229b(d)(1)(B) (stating that commission of offenses described in the criminal 
grounds of inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2) that render the noncitizen either inad-
missible under § 1182(a)(2) or deportable under § 1227(a)(2) stops the accrual of 
continuous residence for lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal and of 
continuous physical presence for non-lawful permanent resident cancellation of re-
moval); id. § 1229c(a)(1) (stating that aggravated felony convictions bar eligibility for 
pre-conclusion voluntary departure); id. § 1229c(b)(1)(B)–(C) (stating that failure to 
show good moral character during the statutory period and aggravated felony convic-
tions bar eligibility for post-conclusion voluntary departure).  If an individual violates 
a protective order by conduct which involves a credible threat of violence, repeated 
harassment or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protective order 
was issued, he or she is removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).   
 50. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 51. See id. § 1101(f); infra Part VIII. 
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complex interplay of various provisions of the Act.  When one factors 
in diverse state and federal statutory language along with the variety 
of prerequisites and obligations imposed by state sentencing disposi-
tions, it begins to become quite clear why application of the Act 
sometimes results in distorted and disparate outcomes at the immi-
gration court level.52  Particularly where the impact of a criminal dis-
position is not thoroughly considered in advance, the risk of unin-
tended consequences is extremely high in this rapidly changing area. 
Very generally, the following is a non-exhaustive list of the criminal 
convictions which often render individuals, including lawful perma-
nent residents, removable from the United States.  They include con-
victions for: an aggravated felony,53 a crime of moral turpitude,54 a 
crime relating to a controlled substance (other than simple possession 
of less than thirty grams of marijuana for personal use),55 a crime of 
domestic violence,56 a firearm offense,57 or document fraud.58 
The most common criminal convictions which render individuals 
with otherwise valid visas inadmissible to the United States include: a 
crime involving moral turpitude,59 any crime relating to a controlled 
substance (with no small-quantity personal-use exception),60 and two 
convictions for any crime where the aggregate sentence imposed is 
five years or more.61 
Several grounds of inadmissibility and a few grounds of removal 
are explicitly based on conduct and, thus, do not require a conviction.  
 
 52.  See United States v. Aguila Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“The process of mapping a generic federal definition onto state crimes—defined 
variously by a combination of common law definitions, model penal codes, statutes, 
and judicial exposition—has exposed the diversity of legal thought among state legis-
latures and courts.”). 
 53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 54.  A person convicted of a crime of moral turpitude is removable if the potential 
term of imprisonment for the crime is one year or longer and the offense was com-
mitted within five years of admission to the United States. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  
 55. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 56. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
 57. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
 58. See id. § 1227(a)(3)(B).  
 59. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).  This ground of inadmissibility does not apply to an 
individual who committed this crime when he or she was under eighteen years of age, 
where the crime was committed more than five years before the application for a visa 
or admission, or if the maximum possible term of imprisonment was one year or less 
and the individual was not sentenced to more than six months in prison. See id. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(II).   
 60. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 61. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(B).   
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Some examples include admission of the essential elements of a crime 
of moral turpitude62 or controlled substance offenses,63 prostitution,64 
alien smuggling,65 or fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact to 
procure or seek to procure an immigration benefit.66  In such cases, 
the DHS may seek to use portions of a criminal trial record where no 
conviction occurred to prove an individual is deportable. 
As used in the Act, the term aggravated felony can be particularly 
misleading to those not familiar with the idiosyncrasies of the Act’s 
provisions.67  The definition of aggravated felony contains twenty-one 
subdivisions.68  It includes such offenses as murder, rape, sexual abuse 
of a minor, crimes of violence, some theft offenses with a sentence of 
at least one year, and illicit trafficking in controlled substances, fire-
arms, or destructive devices.69  It is not too surprising to see these of-
fenses characterized as aggravated felonies.  Some misdemeanor con-
victions carrying a sentence of one year, however, are also aggravated 
felonies—an outcome which is not so intuitive.70  For example, mis-
demeanor convictions for simple battery (unless it is mere offensive 
touching), reckless endangerment, assault, unlawful imprisonment, 
menacing or threatening coercion and theft have come within the 
ambit of the aggravated felony definition.71 
Although the Act has no specific definition of crimes involving 
moral turpitude, case precedent describes these crimes as those which 
shock the public conscience; those which are inherently base, vile, or 
depraved; or those which are contrary to the rules of morality and du-
ties owed between persons.72  Crimes involving moral turpitude have 
been found to include those which involve evil or malicious intent73 or 
 
 62. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (subject to exceptions for juvenile and petty of-
fenses, contained in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(II)). 
 63. See id. §§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(2)(A)(i)(II), (a)(2)(C), 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 64. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(D). 
 65. See id. §§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), 1227(a)(1)(E)(i). 
 66. See id. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1227(a)(1)(E)(i). 
 67. See id. § 1101(a)(43). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See 2 KATHERINE A. BRADY ET AL., DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS IN THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT: IMPACT OF CRIMES UNDER CALIFORNIA AND OTHER STATE LAWS 9–36 
(10th ed. 2008). 
 71. See generally 2 BRADY ET AL., supra note 70, ch. 9. 
 72. See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 351 (1950) (describing an act of moral turpitude as  
“[a]n act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, in the private and social duties which a 
man owes to his fellow man or to society”) (internal citation omitted). 
 73. See Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980) (“An evil or malicious intent 
is said to be the essence of moral turpitude.”). 
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inherent depravity;74 intentional or reckless behavior which risks or 
causes great bodily harm;75 theft with intent to permanently deprive 
the owner;76 and crimes involving intent to defraud.77 
Crimes of moral turpitude provide an excellent example of multi-
ple and differing ramifications under the Act depending on the pro-
cedural context.  An individual is rendered removable if convicted of 
a crime of moral turpitude which carries a possible sentence of one 
year or more within their first five years of admission to the United 
States.78  He or she is also removable if convicted of two crimes of 
moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme regardless of the 
sentence imposed.79  Yet any conviction for a crime of moral turpi-
tude renders an individual inadmissible to the United States, unless 
he or she can qualify for the narrowly drawn juvenile or petty offense 
exceptions.80  Thus a lawful permanent resident may not be remova-
ble from the United States for a crime committed five years after 
coming here, but if he or she leaves the United States—even for a 
short period like a four-day cruise—that lawful permanent resident 
will not be able to re-enter.  Moreover, conviction for or admission of 
a crime of moral turpitude can preclude an individual from demon-
strating good moral character, which is often a statutory prerequisite 
to relief.81 
VI.  SILVA-TREVINO AND CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE 
Perhaps most unusual of all the law relating to crimes of moral tur-
pitude in the immigration context is the treatment they receive in 
 
 74. See Olquin-Rufino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 896 (B.I.A. 2006); Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988) (“Moral turpitude . . . refers generally to conduct [which is] in-
herently base, vile, or depraved, [and] contrary to [accepted] rules of morality and 
the duties owed between [persons] or [to] society in general.”). 
 75. See Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 240 (B.I.A. 2007) (“Moral turpitude may also 
inhere in criminally reckless conduct, i.e., conduct that reflects a conscious disregard 
for a substantial and unjustifiable risk.”); see, e.g., Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 867 
(B.I.A. 1994) (finding that involuntary manslaughter constitutes a crime involving 
moral turpitude); Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111, 113 (B.I.A. 1981) (finding that se-
cond degree murder is a crime involving moral turpitude); Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 
611, 614 (B.I.A. 1976) (finding that aggravated assault is a crime involving moral tur-
pitude).   
 76. See Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1159–61 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 77. See Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 84 (B.I.A. 2001) (describing why fraud 
is readily categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude). 
 78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).   
 79. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 80. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 81. See id. § 1101(f). 
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immigration court following the Attorney General’s decision in Mat-
ter of Silva-Trevino.82  Silva-Trevino has been described by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals as “a comprehensive decision clarifying the 
concept of moral turpitude and articulating a methodology for deter-
mining whether a particular offense is a crime of moral turpitude.”83  
Surprisingly, the greatest impact of this decision does not seem to be 
on the definition of a crime of moral turpitude, though the decision 
does reaffirm that a crime of moral turpitude must be committed with 
specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness.84  What is 
groundbreaking in this decision is the analytical framework it sets 
forth to determine whether a particular offense falls within that defi-
nition. 
Under Silva-Trevino, a three step analysis is used.  The first step is 
familiar to many: the traditional categorical analysis of the elements 
of the statute, an approach set forth by the Supreme Court decision of 
Taylor v. United States.85 Going a bit further, the Attorney General, 
citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, held that the assessment of 
whether a given conviction for a particular offense is a categorical 
match should be based on the existence of a reasonable possibility, as 
opposed to a theoretical possibility, that the statute under which the 
individual was convicted applies to conduct that does not involve 
moral turpitude.86  If this step yields an unambiguous result, the in-
quiry stops there.  If not, the analysis proceeds to the second step, the 
well-understood modified categorical approach. 
This second step is also a familiar approach, requiring examination 
of the traditional record of conviction documents to see whether they 
contain evidence that a crucial fact, one which renders the crime to be 
one involving moral turpitude, was an essential element which was 
proven in the criminal court.87  When this step yields an unambiguous 
result, the analysis stops there. 
If the second step does not resolve the issue, the analysis proceeds 
to a third step. It is the third step that many find surprising. If the 
question of whether the crime was one of moral turpitude is still unre-
 
 82. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (B.I.A. 2008).  But see Jean-Louis v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2009) (specifically declining to fol-
low Silva-Trevino). 
 83. Louissaint, 24 I. & N. Dec. 754, 756 (B.I.A. 2009).  
 84. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 689 n.1, 706 n.5.   
 85. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990).   
 86. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690 (citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 
549 U.S. 183, 193 (1987)). 
 87. See id. at 704; Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 715 (B.I.A. 1999). 
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solved after the modified categorical analysis, Silva-Trevino holds 
that the immigration judge may consider any reliable evidence which 
is deemed necessary and appropriate to ascertain whether the offense 
involved moral turpitude.88 
Silva-Trevino expressly limits this departure from the traditional 
Taylor framework to crimes of moral turpitude; thus, this new analyt-
ical approach cannot be applied to convictions for aggravated felo-
nies, crimes of domestic violence, firearms cases, controlled substanc-
es or any of the other grounds of removal triggered by a conviction.89 
Even with the limitation of Silva-Trevino to crimes of moral turpi-
tude, the addition of a third step to the traditional and well-
understood categorical and modified categorical analyses signals a 
major sea-change for those with criminal convictions.  Immigration 
law has now taken another giant leap away from well-established 
standards shared with other fields of law and created a unique per-
spective which may not be readily understood from the vantage point 
of non-immigration lawyers and criminal court judges. 
Step three of the Silva-Trevino analysis is extremely broad and 
places a tremendous amount of discretion in the hands of immigration 
judges to determine when it is necessary and appropriate to consider 
evidence beyond the record of conviction, and if so, what evidence 
would be proper.  Indeed, many immigration judges now hold Silva-
Trevino hearings to determine inadmissibility or removability.  While 
it is clear that immigration judges may not go behind the conviction to 
reassess guilt or innocence, the question of what evidence is necessary 
and appropriate to consider remains a wide open question at this 
juncture.  For this reason, seasoned immigration practitioners have 
become virtually obsessive in developing records in a way that assures 
no casual or unconsidered fact might creep into the moral turpitude 
assessment down the road.  In light of the Act’s broad inadmissibility 
provisions, which can be triggered by travel decades after a conviction 
has been entered, such caution is clearly warranted. 
VII.  WHAT IS A CONVICTION? 
Another example of where the Act has its own unique approach 
and definition of terminology involves the definition of conviction.90  
Some common state court judgments are regarded as convictions un-
 
 88. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006); see also Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 
551–52 (B.I.A. 1988). 
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der the Act, even though they are not treated as convictions under 
state law.  When applying the Act to inadmissibility and removability, 
the following state court determinations constitute convictions when 
some form of punishment, penalty or restriction is imposed: admis-
sions of fact supporting a conviction, diversion programs if there is a 
finding of guilt, and deferred or withheld adjudication with a plea of 
guilty.91 
Several state remedies that involve amelioration of a conviction 
will not be recognized under the Act as vitiating a conviction.  Some 
examples of such ineffective remedies include certain plea withdraw-
als or expungements.92  Even the vacation of a conviction is ineffec-
tive under the Act where the conviction is vacated solely to alleviate 
immigration consequences.93  Nor does a presidential or gubernatorial 
pardon eliminate all grounds of deportability.94 
There are some outcomes that clearly do not constitute a convic-
tion under the Act.  These include pretrial diversion before a plea is 
entered, deferred prosecution, convictions vacated for legal insuffi-
ciency, or convictions vacated for failure of the trial court to advise 
the defendant of possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea.95 
VIII.  GOOD MORAL CHARACTER 
Other examples under the Act where criminal conduct and crimi-
nal convictions implicate an individual’s status are the provisions re-
lating to good moral character.  The Act defines good moral character 
in the negative, by describing several specific categories of individuals 
who cannot demonstrate good moral character.96  Then it provides a 
 
 91. Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 551–52.   
 92. For example, withdrawal of plea following successful completion of probation 
in Arizona pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-907(a), or, in California, a plea pursuant to de-
ferred entry of judgment (DEJ), Proposition 36, or Penal Code § 1204.3 does not 
eliminate a conviction for immigration purposes. See Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 
F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001).  Another example is New Jersey’s pre-trial intervention 
program. See N.J. CT. R. 3:28, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r3-
28.htm; see also Salazar-Regina, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 227 (B.I.A. 2002); Roldan, 22 I. 
& N. Dec. 512, 527 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 93. See Chavez-Martinez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (B.I.A. 2007); Pickering, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 
2006); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (defining “conviction” under the Act). 
 94. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi). 
 95.  See, for example, the pre-Padilla New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in State v. 
Nunez-Valdez, 975 A.2d 418, 424 (N.J. 2009), holding that ineffective assistance of 
counsel vitiates a guilty plea. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-12 to -22 (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2011); N.J. CT. R. 3:28. 
 96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
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catch-all provision, which makes clear that the fact that an individual 
is not included in one of the specified categories does not preclude a 
finding that good moral character is lacking.97  Among those who 
cannot demonstrate good moral character based on conduct are ha-
bitual drunkards,98 those whose income is derived principally from 
gambling,99 and anyone who has given false testimony for the purpose 
of obtaining a benefit under the Act.100 
The criminal grounds which preclude good moral character are 
based on a reference back to the grounds of inadmissibility relating to 
crimes of moral turpitude, multiple convictions with an aggregate sen-
tence of confinement for five years or more, and controlled substance 
law violations.101  These provisions also specifically include anyone 
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony,102 two or more gam-
bling offenses,103 or who has been confined to a penal institution for 
an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days as a result of a 
conviction or multiple convictions.104  Even without convictions, indi-
viduals may be precluded from demonstrating good moral character 
when their conduct falls into the inadmissibility grounds applicable to 
prostitution, alien smuggling and illegal gambling.105 
Falling into a category where one is precluded from demonstrating 
good moral character has far-reaching consequences under the Act, 
as many immigration benefits, including naturalization, require a 
showing of good moral character for a specified period of time. 
 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. § 1101(f)(1). 
 99. See id. § 1101(f)(4). 
 100. See id. § 1101(f)(6). 
 101. See id. § 1101(f)(3) (providing an exception for a single offense of simple pos-
session of thirty grams or less of marijuana). 
 102. See id. § 1101(f)(8). 
 103. See id. § 1101(f)(5). 
 104. See id. § 1101(f)(7). 
 105. See id. § 1101(f)(3) (precluding a showing of good moral character if the 
noncitizen “admits the commission” of an offense described in sections 1182(a)(2)(D) 
(prostitution) and 1182(a)(2)(6)(E) (alien smuggling)); id. § 1101(f)(4) (precluding a 
showing of good moral character for a person whose income is derived principally 
from illegal gambling); Urzua Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742, 744–46 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (affirming agency’s determination that the petitioner was precluded from 
establishing good moral character based on his admission of alien smuggling in his 
testimony before the immigration judge). 
MARKS & SLAVIN_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:03 PM 
108 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
IX.  COMMON FORMS OF IMMIGRATION RELIEF AVAILABLE IN 
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Immigration judges conduct trials in order to rule on whether the 
DHS has met its burden of proving alienage and removability by 
clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence.106  These civil adminis-
trative determinations are governed by the specific provisions of the 
Act, which provide for due process, fundamental fairness and several 
protections very similar to rights afforded criminal defendants, alt-
hough the formal rules of evidence do not apply.107 
In the majority of cases, the issue of alienage and/or removability is 
not contested.  The bulk of an immigration judge’s role in most cases 
is to rule on whether a respondent in proceedings is statutorily eligi-
ble for any relief from removal and, if so, to determine if he or she 
merits relief in the exercise of discretion.108  The forms of relief most 
often sought in removal proceedings include waivers,109 cancellation 
of removal for permanent residents,110 adjustment to lawful perma-
nent residence status based on family or employer sponsorship,111 
cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents,112 asy-
lum,113 and voluntary departure.114 
Each of these forms of relief has specified statutory requirements, 
but in addition most have a discretionary component—even if an in-
dividual fulfills all the statutory requirements, the application may be 
denied in the discretion of the judge.115  It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to discuss in detail the statutory requirements and discretion-
ary facts which go into ruling on requests for these immigration bene-
fits.  A brief overview, however, will help provide context and serve 
to clarify the ramifications of convictions and criminal behavior, 
 
 106. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). But see 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(2)(B). 
 107. See Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (B.I.A. 1984); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7 (2011).  
 108. Virtually all forms of immigration relief are discretionary, with the exception 
of a couple of remedies provided to fulfill the international treaty obligations of the 
United States not to remove an individual to a country where he or she would face 
persecution or government torture.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. 
 109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
 110. See id. § 1229b(a). 
 111. See id. §§ 1151–1159. 
 112. See id. § 1229b(b). 
 113. See id. § 1158. 
 114. See id. § 1229c. 
 115. See id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (requiring the noncitizen to establish both statutory 
eligibility and, if the relief sought is discretionary, that a favorable exercise of discre-
tion is warranted). 
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demonstrating how they actually play out in immigration court.  Ac-
cordingly, a very basic explanation of the statutory requirements of 
several benefits commonly sought as relief from removal is provided 
below. 
Most important in this discussion is to note the themes regarding 
statutory eligibility and the exercise of discretion that run through the 
Act, applying both to these selected benefits as well as most others.  
For example, criminal convictions, as well as some criminal behavior 
for which no conviction results, bar non-lawful permanent residents 
from almost all statutory eligibility for immigration benefits.116  There 
are waivers which exist in a variety of circumstances, but they gener-
ally require qualifying relatives and a showing that the respondent’s 
removal would cause them extreme hardship, a narrowly defined 
term under the Act.117  Few benefits under the Act are available to 
non-lawful permanent residents found to be lacking good moral char-
acter.  Moreover, behavior which does not automatically preclude 
good moral character under the Act may nevertheless be considered 
in arriving at the determination of whether a favorable exercise of 
discretion is warranted.118 
Lawful permanent residents who are removable for crimes other 
than an aggravated felony may apply for cancellation of removal if 
they have been lawful permanent residents for five years, have resid-
ed continuously in the United States for seven years after having been 
admitted in any status, and can demonstrate that they are deserving 
of the favorable exercise of discretion.119  There are bars to this waiv-
 
 116. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(f)(3) (precluding noncitizens who are convicted of or 
“admit committing” offenses described in the criminal grounds of inadmissibility 
listed in sections 1182(a)(2)(A)–(D) and 1182 (a)(6)(E)); id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 
(B)(i) (stating that convictions for a “particularly serious crime,” which includes ag-
gravated felonies, bar eligibility for asylum); id. 1229b(a)(3) (stating that aggravated 
felony convictions bar eligibility for lawful permanent resident cancellation of re-
moval); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (stating that failure to show good moral character 
during the statutory period and convictions for certain offenses bar eligibility for non-
lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal); id. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (stating that 
“commission” of certain offenses stops the accrual of continuous residence for lawful 
permanent resident cancellation of removal and of continuous physical presence for 
non-lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal); id. § 1229c(a)(1) (stating 
that aggravated felony convictions bar eligibility for pre-conclusion voluntary depar-
ture); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (stating that failure to show good moral character 
during the statutory period and aggravated felony convictions bar eligibility for post-
conclusion voluntary departure). 
 117. See id. § 1182(h)—(i). 
 118. See, e.g., C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (B.I.A. 1998); Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
191, 194–95 (B.I.A. 1990); Villegas Aguirre, 13 I. & N. Dec. 139, 140 (B.I.A. 1971).  
 119. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
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er based on the timing of the commission of the crime and the initia-
tion of removal proceedings.120  A similar waiver, but more generous 
since it is applicable to more crimes, is available to lawful permanent 
residents whose convictions were obtained by plea agreements prior 
to April 24, 1996.121  While cancellation of removal can only be grant-
ed to a lawful permanent resident one time,122 a waiver of some con-
victions may be available to lawful permanent residents who are re-
turning to the United States or those who can apply to readjust their 
status, if their removal would result in extreme hardship to a qualify-
ing relative.123 
Very generally, an individual may apply for adjustment of status to 
that of a lawful permanent resident based on an approved petition 
filed by a specified qualifying relative or employer if he or she has 
been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States and is 
not inadmissible to the United States.124  There are several additional 
potential disqualifiers too complex to discuss here, but one extremely 
relevant factor is that the applicant must demonstrate that he or she is 
deserving of the favorable exercise of discretion.125  It is important to 
note that, regardless of whether the applicant for this benefit is apply-
ing while in removal proceedings or not, the grounds of inadmissibil-
ity are central to eligibility since one of the statutory prerequisites for 
adjustment of status is to show that one is not inadmissible.126 
Some respondents in removal proceedings are eligible to apply for 
cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.127  To 
demonstrate statutory eligibility, a respondent must demonstrate ten 
years of continuous physical presence, good moral character during 
that period, that he or she has not been convicted of offenses that are 
described as grounds for removal or inadmissibility under certain 
listed sections of the Act, and that his or her removal would cause a 
United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent or 
child exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.128  This benefit is 
 
 120. See id. § 1229b(d). 
 121. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001), superseded by statute, REAL ID 
Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1778 (2006). 
 122. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6). 
 123. See id. § 1182(h).  
 124. See generally id. § 1255. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. § 1255(a). 
 127. See id. § 1229b(b). 
 128. See id. § 1229b(b)(1). 
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also available only in the exercise of discretion.129  Repeating and ex-
panding on the theme seen in adjustment of status eligibility, note 
that the criminal grounds of inadmissibility and removability, as well 
as the good moral character criminal preclusions, are grafted onto this 
benefit as potential bars to demonstrating statutory eligibility. 
An individual is eligible to apply for asylum in the United States if 
he or she can demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of 
future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.130  While there 
are several specified bases which mandate a denial of an application 
for asylum, relevant here are the provisions which preclude a grant of 
relief to an applicant who has been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime in the United States.131  A conviction of an 
aggravated felony is considered a conviction of a particularly serious 
crime by definition in the Act.132 
Perhaps the most commonly sought form of relief from removal, 
albeit the most limited in terms of the status it affords, is voluntary 
departure.  To avoid the adverse consequences of an order of remov-
al, such as monetary sanctions and a bar to many immigration bene-
fits for a period of ten years, an individual in removal proceedings 
may request voluntary departure.133  Voluntary departure provides 
permission to leave the United States at one’s own expense, rather 
than being removed by the government.134  Prehearing voluntary de-
parture is sought at one’s first appearance in immigration court and 
only aggravated felons and persons engaged in terrorist activities are 
barred from eligibility.135  When requesting voluntary departure at the 
conclusion of a removal hearing, one must show, inter alia, physical 
presence in the United States for at least one year prior to service of 
the charging document, good moral character for the preceding five 
 
 129. See id. § 1229b(b). 
 130. See id. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a). 
 131. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(ii).   
 132. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); see also Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (B.I.A. 
2002) (finding that aggravated felonies which involve unlawful drug trafficking pre-
sumptively constitute serious crimes absent extraordinary and compelling circum-
stances for purposes of withholding of removal, a similar, but more stringent, form of 
relief). 
 133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. § 1229c(b)(1)(c). 
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years, and additionally, that the individual is not removable as an ag-
gravated felon or terrorist.136   
X.  PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
 Now that we have provided a basic overview of the potential 
effects of criminal convictions on noncitizens, we will examine how 
these effects play out in immigration court.  Noncitizens with criminal 
convictions, their families, and sometimes even their attorneys, who 
come before the immigration court often feel like they have entered a 
carnival “house of mirrors.”  An all too frequent lament heard in im-
migration courts across the country goes something like, “But I’ve al-
ready served my time/completed my probation successfully/paid my 
fine—how can I be charged with the same crime here?”  It is under-
standable that people may confuse the “collateral” immigration con-
sequences of a criminal conviction with the “punishment” of their 
sentence and feel they are being punished twice for the same crime.  
The United States Supreme Court has called the effect of being or-
dered deported or removed to be the equivalent of banishment, a sen-
tence to life in exile, loss of property, life or all that makes life worth 
living, and, in essence, a “punishment of the most drastic kind.”137  An 
order of removal (deportation) can effectively amount to a death sen-
tence when an alien will be subject to persecution upon return to his 
or her country.138  When an immigration judge explains that although 
a person may have satisfied the sentence of the criminal court there 
may still be immigration consequences to the conviction, common re-
sponses include, “I never would have accepted the plea agreement if I 
had known,” or, “My attorney told me that it was an ‘adjudication 
withheld’ and not even a real conviction.”  Thus, it was not surprising 
that the Supreme Court was asked to address the conditions under 
which plea agreements would be binding when a miscommunication 
about immigration consequences occurred. 
In Padilla v. Kentucky,139 it was as if the Supreme Court had heard 
the laments of noncitizens in immigration courts.  Padilla himself, a 
lawful permanent resident for over forty years and a Vietnam veteran 
 
 136. See id. § 1229c(b)(1). 
 137. Lehman v. United States, 353 U.S. 685, 691 (1957); accord Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
 138.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Padilla-Agustin v. 
INS, 21 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 139. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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who faced deportation based on an aggravated felony after pleading 
guilty to transportation of a large amount of marijuana, claimed that 
he would not have accepted the plea had he not been misinformed by 
his attorney that he “did not have to worry about immigration status 
since he had been in the country so long.”140  The Court again recog-
nized the dramatic, harsh consequences of criminal convictions for 
noncitizens.  Indeed, it noted that immigration law had changed dra-
matically and that immigration reforms had “expanded the class of 
deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate 
the harsh consequences of deportation.”141  Based on these changes, 
the Court found that “as a matter of federal law, deportation is an in-
tegral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the pen-
alty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty 
to specified crimes,”142 reflecting the chorus oft-heard in immigration 
courts.  For these reasons, the Court majority opinion rejected the 
finding of the state court that erroneous advice about immigration 
consequences is merely “collateral” and thus not covered by the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.143  Ulti-
mately, the Court held that Padilla’s attorney’s incorrect advice was 
constitutionally deficient, and the case was remanded to determine if 
prejudice resulted.144  The Court did not limit its holding to alleged 
affirmative misadvise, and further held that it is the duty of counsel to 
provide advice about issues like deportation.145  Finally, the court 
considered the concerns that its holding might open a “floodgate” of 
challenges to plea agreements, but held that such a flood was unlikely 
based on past experience with similar cases, the possibility that such 
attacks could result in less favorable outcomes for the defendants, 
and that informed consideration of possible immigration consequenc-
es could only benefit the plea bargaining process.146 
The immediate effect of Padilla on immigration proceedings is evi-
dent—noncitizens who are able to vacate their pleas may escape the 
consequence of a removal/deportation order.  If a noncitizen’s crimi-
nal conviction is vacated on the basis of a procedural defect in the 
 
 140. Id. at 1478. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1480 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 1482.  Ultimately, the court found that the “collateral versus direct dis-
tinction is . . . ill-suited to evaluating” the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in 
the deportation context.  Id. 
 144. See id. at 1483–84. 
 145. See id. at 1484. 
 146. See id. at 1485–86. 
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underlying criminal proceedings, it no longer constitutes a conviction 
for immigration purposes and removal proceedings are terminated 
without an order of removal.147  In Matter of Adamiak, the Board 
held that a conviction vacated under an Ohio statute for failure of the 
trial court to advise the noncitizen defendant of the possible immigra-
tion consequences of a guilty plea is no longer valid for immigration 
purposes.148  Immigration courts may scrutinize the basis for a 
vacatur, because case law requires that the conviction not be vacated 
solely for rehabilitative or immigration purposes.149  A noncitizen try-
ing to avoid the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction 
should be prepared to present evidence of the underlying reasons for 
the vacatur if it is not clear from the criminal court order itself, such 
as a copy of the motion to vacate or a transcript of the hearing on the 
motion.150 
Surprisingly, one of the first questions that may be created by Pa-
dilla is whether it imposes any additional duties on an immigration 
judge.  An immigration judge is required to address all issues related 
to removability and to inform respondents appearing before him or 
her of any “apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enu-
merated” in the immigration law.151  This is a formidable task because 
of the complex and constantly-changing law in this area.  Could this 
duty require immigration judges to advise noncitizens of relief that 
 
 147. See Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378, 1380 (B.I.A. 2000).  But it should 
be noted that a criminal conviction vacated based on a state rehabilitative statute or 
to ameliorate the immigration consequences remains a conviction for immigration 
purposes. See Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 269 (6th Cir. 2006); Rodriguez-
Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1379. 
 148. See Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878, 881 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 149. See Nath v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A vacated 
conviction can serve as the basis of removal only if the conviction was vacated for 
reasons ‘unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings,’ that is, for 
equitable, rehabilitation, or immigration hardship reasons.  But a conviction vacated 
because of a ‘procedural or substantive defect’ is not considered a ‘conviction’ for 
immigration purposes and cannot serve as the basis for removability.” (quoting Pick-
ering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 454 F.3d 525 
(6th Cir. 2006))). 
 150. See Chavez-Martinez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273–74 (B.I.A. 2007) (noting the 
conflict between circuits regarding which party bears the burden of proving why the 
conviction was vacated and holding that in the context of a removal order, the party 
seeking reopening bears the burden); see also Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 40–
41 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the noncitizen bears the burden of proving that a con-
viction was not vacated solely for immigration reasons). But see Nath v. Gonzales, 
467 F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2006) (placing burden of proving why the conviction 
was set aside on the government); Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 
n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (same for motions to reopen). 
 151. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.8(d), 1240.11(a)(2) (2011) (emphasis added). 
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may be available to them if they are able to set aside a conviction 
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?  It is black-letter 
law that an immigration judge cannot go behind a record of convic-
tion to determine the guilt or innocence of a respondent.152  But if an 
unrepresented respondent advises the court of a potential ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, does the immigration judge have a duty 
to advise a respondent of relief which would be available if the con-
viction were to be set aside by the appropriate criminal court?  The 
regulatory language uses the words “apparent eligibility,” suggesting 
that a broad interpretation should be given.  In addition, the recently 
published Ethics and Professionalism Guide for Immigration Judges 
reveals that immigration judges are held responsible for complying 
with the standards applicable to all attorneys in the Department of 
Justice, even those applicable to prosecutors.153  Thus, the Padilla case 
may impose an additional duty on immigration judges. 
Another possibility is that noncitizens who wish to pursue post-
conviction relief under Padilla may appear in immigration court and 
request termination of proceedings to pursue such relief.  Given that, 
as discussed above, an immigration court will not go behind a record 
of conviction, this may not be sufficient grounds for termination.  The 
DHS may “cancel” a notice to appear before it is filed with the immi-
gration court or may move to dismiss on various grounds after it has 
been filed.154  Although neither of these remedies explicitly mentions 
the vacatur of a criminal court conviction as an appropriate justifica-
tion, several of the grounds are broad.  For example, a motion to dis-
miss can be because “[c]ircumstances of the case have changed after 
the notice to appear was issued to such an extent that continuation is 
no longer in the best interests of the government.”155  A case can also 
be administratively closed—which temporarily removes the case from 
the docket—if not opposed by either party.156 
 
 152.  See, e.g., De La Cruz v. INS, 951 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding 
immigration judge’s refusal to grant continuance of deportation hearing to determine 
whether respondent was informed of deportation consequences of his guilty plea be-
fore finding him removable and denying voluntary departure); Sirhan, 13 I. & N. 
Dec. 592, 594 (B.I.A. 1970). 
 153.  See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONALISM GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION JUDGES, art. II (2011), available at 
www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/IJConduct/EthicsandProfessionalismGuideforIJs.pdf. 
 154. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(a), (c). 
 155. Id. § 239.2(a)(7). 
 156. Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 479, 480 (B.I.A. 1996). 
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Noncitizens in immigration proceedings who may want to pursue 
post-conviction relief under Padilla may also request that the court 
continue the proceedings until the motion to vacate is decided by the 
criminal court.  Immigration judges have broad discretionary authori-
ty over continuances, which are allowed for “good cause” and for a 
“reasonable time.”157  “Good cause” is not defined in the regulations, 
but has been interpreted on a case-by-case basis.158 
It is instructive to look at the case law that has developed on mo-
tions for continuance based on a visa petition pending with the DHS 
since in both cases the immigration court is being asked to delay pro-
ceedings to wait for the decision of another entity, which could impact 
a respondent’s eligibility for relief from removal.  In Matter of Gar-
cia,159 the Board held that, as a general rule, discretion should be fa-
vorably exercised where a prima facie approvable visa petition and 
adjustment application has been submitted.  Thus, in seeking a con-
tinuance based on a motion to vacate a criminal conviction, a nonciti-
zen should present prima facie evidence regarding the  motion—i.e., 
the motion itself, affidavit of criminal counsel regarding misadvise or 
failure to advise regarding immigration consequences of the plea, or a 
plea colloquy. 
A recent case has given some guidance on considerations in mo-
tions to continue.  In Matter of Hashmi, the Board announced various 
factors to consider when determining if good cause exists to continue 
immigration proceedings based on a visa petition pending with the 
DHS. Those factors include: (1) the DHS response to the motion; (2) 
whether the underlying petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the re-
spondent’s statutory eligibility for relief; (4) whether respondent’s re-
lief application will merit a favorable exercise of discretion; and (5) 
the reason for the continuance and other procedural factors.160 These 
factors were described as merely illustrative, and the Board noted 
 
 157. Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 788 (B.I.A. 2009); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6. 
 158. See, e.g., Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding the 
immigration judge did not abuse her discretion in finding the petitioner had not 
shown good cause for his second motion for a continuance in order to provide cor-
roborative evidence in support of his asylum application); Jimenez-Guzman v. Hold-
er, 642 F.3d 1294, 1296–98 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding the agency did not abuse its dis-
cretion in finding no good cause for the petitioner’s motion for a continuance to 
await the adjudication in state court of his motion for post-conviction relief where he 
had already been granted several continuances). 
 159. Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 653, 657 (B.I.A. 1978), superseded by statute, Immi-
gration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, as recognized in Arthur, 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 475, 479 (B.I.A. 1992).   
 160. Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 790. 
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that the focus of the inquiry should be on the ultimate likelihood of 
success of relief from removal before the court.161  Thus, in addition 
to pleadings before the criminal court, a noncitizen seeking a contin-
uance may want to submit a copy of the application for relief that he 
wishes to pursue with supporting documents to show he or she is a 
worthy candidate for that relief.  Most importantly, the Board 
stressed, “if the DHS affirmatively expresses a lack of opposition, the 
proceedings ordinarily should be continued . . . in the absence of unu-
sual, clearly identified, and supported reasons for not doing so.”162  
Therefore, a noncitizen requesting a continuance should seek the 
concurrence of the DHS.  Ultimately, however, the outcomes of deci-
sions on continuances are difficult to predict since they are heavily 
dependent on the unique facts presented in each case. 
Another recent case addressing the denial of a continuance pend-
ing the appeal of a state court denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel illustrates the analysis 
that may occur regarding a motion to continue to vacate a plea.163  
The First Circuit found that the denial of the motion to continue was 
not an abuse of discretion, noting that the immigration judge had al-
ready continued the removal hearing several times while the nonciti-
zen’s motion for post-conviction relief was pending with the state 
criminal court.  In addition, the Court observed that the conviction 
record “reflect[ed] that [the noncitizen] acknowledged, in writing, the 
fact that his guilty plea to the controlled substance charge [would] 
cause deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or 
denial of naturalization or other immigration consequences.”164 
Having addressed how Padilla may affect noncitizens with pending 
removal proceedings, the next query may be how it will affect nonciti-
zens who have been ordered deported either based on criminal con-
victions that were the result of a plea they now wish to challenge, or 
noncitizens who were ordered deported because they were not eligi-
ble for relief from removal based on a plea that they are moving to 
vacate.  In such cases, a noncitizen may seek to move to reopen the 
removal proceedings. 
Initially, it should be noted that by regulation, a person who has 
been physically deported and is outside the United States cannot file 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 791 (emphasis added). 
 163. See Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder, 642 F.3d at 1294. 
 164. Id. at 1296, 1299. 
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a motion to reopen.165  However, this regulation has been found to be 
invalid by at least one circuit court.166 
Motions to reopen in removal proceedings are disfavored because 
there is a strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close, espe-
cially in immigration cases where “granting such motions too freely 
will permit endless delay of deportation.”167  There are strict require-
ments in the regulations for motions to reopen including numerical 
and time requirements.168  Specifically, a party may file only one mo-
tion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than ninety 
days after the date on which the final administrative decision was 
rendered.169  While there are some regulatory exceptions to these 
numerical and time bars, they are very limited and none of them ex-
plicitly address the vacatur of a criminal conviction upon which a re-
moval order is based.170  Thus, unless a noncitizen’s motion can be 
construed to fall within one of these limited exceptions, the motion is 
barred if the conviction is vacated more than ninety days after his or 
her removal order is final.  A respondent can avoid numerical and 
time bars by requesting that an immigration judge or the Board reo-
pen proceedings sua sponte, but sua sponte reopening may only be 
used in exceptional circumstances and not to cure a filing defect or 
circumvent the regulations.171 
Despite all of these restrictions, the Board “has routinely been will-
ing to overlook the untimeliness of an alien’s motion to reopen when 
a conviction supporting a removal order is vacated . . .”172  In fact, the 
Third Circuit identified ten unpublished cases where the Board reo-
pened proceedings, finding that convictions supporting removal or-
ders were or may have been invalid under Pickering.173  While none 
of these decisions are precedential, this seems to indicate that there 
may be a willingness to address motions to reopen based on vacated 
 
 165. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011). 
 166. See Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he physical removal 
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motion to reopen.”); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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and orders based on fraud). 
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convictions.  Case law in this area is likely to rapidly evolve in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla.  
CONCLUSION 
We hope that our overview of immigration law and how the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Padilla may affect it has not left you feeling 
“Curiouser and Curiouser.”  As Justice Alito noted in his concurring 
opinion, immigration law is so complex and specialized that it is not 
always easy to tell when the law is clear.174  What does appear clear is 
that the Padilla case will have an impact on state court determinations 
of whether counsel has been constitutionally deficient regarding past 
pleas, and if so, whether the deficiency was prejudicial.  As these is-
sues are raised and presented in immigration court, it will be incum-
bent on immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals to 
decide whether to delay or reopen removal proceedings.  While we do 
not have a crystal ball, this Article has given you a glimpse into some 
of the factors which will be considered in making these decisions, the 
language we speak in the immigration courts, and how these decisions 
appear through our looking glass. 
 
 174. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1490 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
